sAVSS: Scalable Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing in BFT Protocols by Basu, Soumya et al.
sAVSS: Scalable Asynchronous Verifiable Secret
Sharing in BFT Protocols
Soumya Basu1,2,3, Alin Tomescu1,4, Ittai Abraham1, Dahlia Malkhi1, Michael K. Reiter1,5, and Emin Gu¨n Sirer2,3
1VMWare Research
2Cornell University
3IC3
4MIT
5UNC-Chapel Hill
Abstract—This paper introduces a new way to incorporate
verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes into Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT) protocols. This technique extends the threshold
guarantee of classical Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithms to in-
clude privacy as well. This provides applications with a powerful
primitive: a threshold trusted third party, which simplifies many
difficult problems such as a fair exchange.
In order to incorporate VSS into BFT, we introduced sAVSS,
a framework that transforms any VSS scheme into an asyn-
chronous VSS scheme with constant overhead. By incorporating
Kate et al.’s scheme [1] into our framework, we obtain an
asynchronous VSS that has constant overhead on each replica—
the first of its kind.
We show that a key-value store built using BFT replication
and sAVSS supports writing secret-shared values with about a
30% − 50% throughput overhead with less than 35 millisecond
request latencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Combining the power of Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT)
replication with secret sharing, one can build a decentralized
service that acts over private values in a coordinated manner
by consensus decrees. This powerful combination can be
leveraged in various ways to build an automated, decentralized
threshold trusted third party (T3P). For example, it may be
used to build a decentralized T3P escrow. Crucially, escrowed
secrets will be opened by consensus decree, not necessarily
requiring client interaction. One can easily derive a fair-
exchange from such an escrow service: One party confiden-
tially stores one value, another party confidentially stores a
second value; a consensus decree opens both. Another example
use-case is a decentralized T3P certification authority (CA).
The CA employs some policy that automates certification deci-
sions. The CA utilizes threshold signing to certify documents,
and again, if and when to certify is decided automatically by
consensus. Using polynomial secret sharing, multiple values
entrusted to a decentralized T3P may be aggregated without
client involvement. Simple additive aggregations are trivial
to implement. Arbitrary multi-party computation is possible
(e.g., [2], [3]), though more costly.
In all of these use-cases, the enabling core is a mechanism
called Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) [4] used for populating
a decentralized service with secret values. Our use of VSS
weaves it into BFT replication in order to automate the
handling of secret values. For example, in a private key-value
store we designed, a client request to store an entry is broken
into two parts, public and private. The public part works as
a normal BFT replication request. However, replicas delay
their participation in the ordering protocol until they obtain a
verifiable share of the private component of the store request.
The private part of a client protocol utilizes VSS for the client
to directly share the private entry.
Partly due to the need to weave VSS into a BFT replication
engine, the setting of interest to us is asynchronous. Relying
on synchrony requires making conservative assumptions about
the network delay, whereas asynchronous protocols move
at the speed of the network. Even worse, incorporating a
synchronous VSS scheme into a BFT replication engine would
require the replication engine to make a synchrony assumption
even if one was not required for the BFT protocol to work.
The best known Asynchronous VSS (AVSS) solutions re-
quire a client (dealer) to incur quadratic communication and
message complexities in order to store a single value [1]. This
requires each replica to process and store a linear number of
bits, which means that the performance overhead due to the
addition of secret sharing increases linearly with the number
of replicas. When AVSS and BFT replication solutions were
originally developed, most BFT solutions were aimed for
systems of four (f = 1) or seven (f = 2) replicas. However,
today, BFT replication is being revisited at scale in blockchain
systems of hundreds or thousands of replicas. Incurring such
a large degradation in service performance for privacy may be
prohibitively expensive.
To scale out AVSS, this paper introduces a new verifiable
secret sharing framework called sAVSS. sAVSS is a framework
that, given a VSS scheme, constructs an AVSS scheme whose
performance is only a constant factor away from the original
VSS scheme. We instantiate sAVSS in two ways: (1) using
Kate, et al.’s secret sharing scheme [1], which gives us a
an AVSS that has constant time share verification and share
recovery and (2) using Pedersen’s secret sharing scheme [5]
which, while only providing linear time share verification and
recovery, has cheaper cryptographic operations. Our frame-
work is based on one key concept: the recovery polynomial.
The recovery polynomial is a single polynomial that encodes
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recovery information for f shares. Thus, by only sharing a
small, constant number of additional polynomials, the client
can enable all 3f + 1 shares to be recovered.
We intertwine sAVSS in a BFT replication system and
build a full private key-value store solution. Our key-value
store performs well in practice, with only a 30% to 50%
throughput overhead over a nonprivate key-value store with
request latencies less than 35 milliseconds.
This paper contributes a new framework for constructing
asynchronous verifiable secret sharing schemes through the
use of recovery polynomials, sAVSS. We then instantiate
sAVSS using two verifiable secret sharing schemes and bench-
mark the overhead that our new framework adds. Finally, we
incorporate our two instantiations into PBFT [6] and evaluate
a private, Byzantine Fault Tolerant key value store.
II. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide a high-level, informal overview
of the core technique we develop to solve the asynchronous
VSS problem. A precise description and details are given in
the following sections.
A. The Asynchronous VSS Problem
In the asynchronous VSS problem, a dealer shares to a
group of n participants a polynomial s. The API for sharing
is denoted vssShare. If the sharing completes anywhere, then
eventually every non-faulty participant completes the sharing.
The basic method for secret sharing (API: vssShare) is to
provide participant i a point (xi, s(xi)) on the polynomial s.
The method fulfills two key properties, hiding and binding:
• Loosely speaking, hiding means that for a polynomial s
of degree f , any k = f + 1 shares suffice to reconstruct
it via interpolation (API: vssReconstruct), and that no
combination of f or less reveal any information about it.
• Binding means that every participant receives, in addition
to its private share, a global commitment c to the poly-
nomial s that binds the share it receives as a verifiable
valid share of s (API: vssVerify).
In asynchronous settings, a dealer can wait for at most n−f
participants to acknowledge receiving a valid share, before it
inevitably may walk away. Note that it is possible for the
dealer to walk away before all of the honest replicas have a
valid share. The asynchronous VSS problem requires that if
the dealer (or any participant) completes the share protocol,
then every correct participant can eventually reconstruct its
share using a distributed protocol with f + 1 correct par-
ticipants: Participants contribute recovery information (API:
vssRecoverContrib∗), which is validated by the recipient (API:
vssRecoverVerify∗) and then combined to reconstruct the miss-
ing share (API: vssRecover∗).
AVSS in Byzantine Fault Tolerance There are a few design
goals to meet when using AVSS for state machine replication.
For example, it is acceptable for a Byzantine client to lose
the hiding guarantee. However, every sharing must always be
binding otherwise the replicated state machine can be in an
inconsistent state.
Additionally, there are many different Byzantine Fault Tol-
erance (BFT) algorithms in the literature that have been op-
timized to perform under certain circumstances. For example,
some BFT algorithms [7], [8] have often incorporated a linear
”fast-path” suitable for cases where there are few failures. In
particular, this search for more optimized performance in the
common case is something that we forsee continuing in the
BFT literature.
Thus, it is important for a secret sharing scheme to have
minimal overheads in the common case. In particular, a
verifiable secret sharing scheme used in BFT must meet the
requirement that vssShare∗ only incurs O(1) overhead for the
replicas. This ensures that the same techniques will be reusable
for more scalable BFT protocols that work with larger clusters.
B. Existing Solutions.
The seminal work by Shamir [9] introduced the idea of
employing polynomial interpolation, a technique that was
used before for error correction codes, to share a secret with
unconditional security. A line of work emanated from this
result and addressed many additional features, such as share
verifiability, asynchrony, and proactive share refresh.
Share verifiability tackles the problem of a malicious
dealer that equivocates and maliciously shares values that
are inconsistent. There are many such schemes with different
properties, from classical works such as Feldman [10] and
Pedersen [5]’s schemes to newer works such as Kate et al. [1]
and SCAPE [11]. sAVSS can take any of these works as
input and construct a verifiable secret sharing scheme that also
handles asynchrony.
Original solutions for asynchronous VSS in the information-
theoretic setting were introduced in the context of Byzantine
agreement and secure MPC [12]. They incur communication
complexity of O(n6 log n) and message complexity O(n5).
AVSS. The first practical asynchronous VSS solution in the
computational setting was introduced by Cachin et al. [13]. We
will refer to it by the name AVSS. To cope with asynchrony,
AVSS uses a bivariate secret polynomial sˆ(·, ·). Share i con-
sists of two univariate polynomials, sˆ(i, ·), sˆ(·, i), and so the
dealer sends O(n) information to each participant. A missing
i’th share can be reconstructed from f+1 evaluations of sˆ(i, ·)
and f+1 evaluations of sˆ(·, i), incurring linear communication
overhead per recovery, for an overall recovery complexity of
O(n2) messages and O(n3) bits.
Additionally, participants need to verify that all shares are
bound to the same polynomial. AVSS makes use of Pedersen
polynomial commitments [5] for all polynomials sˆ(i, ·), sˆ(·, i),
i = 1..n. This commitment scheme leverages the hardness of
discrete log in a multiplicative group of order q with generator
g. A commitment c(v) to a value v ∈ Zq is a value gvhr,
where h is another element of the group and r is a secret
drawn at random from Zq . A Pedersen commitment to a
polynomial s(·) ∈ Zq[x] consists of a set of commitments
to n values, i.e., c(s(·)) = {〈xi, c(s(xi))〉}ni=1. Given any
pair 〈x, s(x)〉, it is possible to verify that this point is on
s(·) using the commitment’s homomorphic properties, i.e., that
for any v1, v2 ∈ Zq , c(v1)c(v2) is a valid commitment to
v1 + v2 mod q.
AVSS weaves into the sharing protocol the dissemination of
commitments [14] while incurring message complexity O(n2)
and communication complexity O(n3).
eAVSS-SC. Kate et al. [1] introduces a polynomial commit-
ment that has constant size. This commitment scheme lever-
ages the hardness of the q-Strong Diffe-Hellman assumption
in some group with order q where g is a generator. In Kate et
al., a commitment c(s(·)) is defined as c(s(·)) = gs(τ), where
τ is unknown to all participants and s(τ) is the polynomial s
evaluated at τ . To commit to a particular evaluation (or share)
s(i), the dealer also produces a witness, g
s(τ)−s(i)
τ−i . Given any
triple of share, witness and commitment, it is possible to verify
that the share is indeed the evaluation of the polynomial at that
point using a bilinear map. The technique was employed by
Backes et al. [15] to construct an asynchronous VSS scheme
called eAVSS-SC that incurs both message and communication
complexities O(n2).
In eAVSS-SC, a dealer chooses ,in addition to the secret
polynomial s, another n polynomials sˆi, i = 1..n. sˆi encodes
share i of s for recovery purposes. Each of s, sˆi, has a
constant-size polynomial commitment due to the scheme by
Kate et al. [1]. The commitments are constructed such that
a commitment of sˆi validates it as a share of s. Using the
homomorphism of the commitments, eAVSS-SC weaves into
the sharing protocol the dissemination of commitments while
incurring both message complexity and bit complexity O(n2).
The need for a new scheme. All of the above schemes
fail to satisfy our two requirements above. In particular, the
dealer computes O(n2) commitment values and sends O(n2)
bits. Hence, to date, all asynchronous VSS solutions require
a dealer, who wants to store a single secret to a system, to
incur O(n2) communication complexities, which means that
a replica must process O(n) bits per request. This can be
quite prohibitive for moderate n values, e.g., n = 1, 000, and
infeasible for n = 50, 000.
Fundamentally, prior asynchronous VSS schemes allow
share recovery by having the dealer enumerate all pairwise
responses between replicas during recovery. In other words, if
replica i is helping replica iˆ recover, the dealer has shared with
i the response to send to iˆ. However, such an approach must
require quadratic bandwidth on the dealer. To get around this
difficulty, we make use of a distributed pseudorandom function
(DPRF), allowing these recovery responses to be generated
dynamically using information shared in the setup phase.
C. sAVSS
Our solution, named sAVSS (for ‘scalable AVSS’), is the
first in which the replica work is constant per sharing in the
common case.
Our approach is to use proactive secret sharing [16] in order
to construct recovery polynomials to help a replica recover a
share. Informally, suppose that a replica i has share s(i), which
is simply a point on the polynomial s. In order to recover this
share, the other replicas construct a Recovery Polynomial (RP).
A Recovery Polynomial si is random at every point except for
i, where si(i) = 0. Thus, if the recovering replica i receives
shares of the sum of the original polynomial and the masking
polynomial, si(·) + s(·), it can recover its own share without
obtaining any information about any other share.
However, adapting this technique to the asynchonous setting
is nontrivial. First, each RP must be well defined for each i and
having every honest replica agree on the same polynomial in
the presence of adversarial nodes is very expensive. We resolve
this by having our dealer construct the recovery polynomials
for each replica. Since we are already checking that the dealer
is sharing the secret consistently, doing this for the recovery
polynomials is easy. Additionally, a dishonest dealer does not
need any privacy guarantees, which means that we only need
to check for malicious behavior that hurts the consistency of
the replica’s shares.
While this approach solves the need to agree on a recovery
polynomial, the dealer still needs to share n recovery polyno-
mials which will incur a quadratic cost. To fix this problem,
we first make the observation that there is no particular need
for the constraint that si(i) = 0 as long as replica i knows
what the value of si(i) is. Our scheme uses a distributed
pseudorandom function in order to communicate the value
of that point efficiently. Now that the value of si(i) can be
any random point, we can actually encode multiple replica’s
recovery polynomials as one recovery polynomial. To ensure
that all points of si are random, we encode f points into one
recovery polynomial. Thus, the dealer only needs to construct
four recovery polynomials for the entire cluster.
We now present a high level description of our protocol.
Let a Recovery Polynomial sj encode f secret values. The
dealer partitions the secret shares of s into ` = dn/fe groups,
and uses ` RPs sj , j = 1..`, to encode the corresponding
groups. Every one of original n shares of s is encoded in one
of the RPs. The dealer shares both s and the sj’s among the n
participants, and participants use the sj’s for share recovery.
More specifically, an RP sj is a random polynomial of
degree f that has f pre-defined points. For (j−1)f ≤ i < jf ,
the recovery polynomial sj is constructed so that sj(i) = yi,
where yi = F(i) for a DPRF F with reconstruction threshold
f . (In our actual construction, yi = F(〈r, i〉) for a random
value r, to ensure that sj is distinct each time. But we elide
r for our discussion here.) The dealer shares each sj among
the n participants, as well as s.
To recover its share, participant i probes other participants,
to which each participant responds with its share of s+ sj for
j = di/fe. Each participant iˆ can construct its response from
its shares of s and sj . In addition, participant iˆ also responds
with their shares of F(i), i.e., of the secret value sj(i). (In
API terms, vssRecoverContrib∗ returns a share of s+ sj and
a share of F (ˆi).) Participant iˆ then reconstructs s+ sj in full
and computes (s+ sj)(i)−F(i) = s(i) (API: vssRecover∗).
To verify a recovery share (vssRecoverVerify∗), first partici-
pant i validates each share of s+sj that it receives against the
commitment c(s+ sj), which it computes from c(s) and c(sj).
Then it validates the recovery result against the commitment
c(s). A technicality to note here is that in the Kate et al.
commitment scheme, each share must be accompanied by a
witness used for commitment validation. Participants need to
recover witnesses for validation. The witness for participant
for i could be encoded into the RPs, at the expense of
sharing polynomials over much larger fields. Luckily, this
is not necessary; witnesses can be reconstructed leveraging
homomorphism over the witnesses of the participants that
participate in the recovery protocol (details in Section V-B2 ).
If validation fails, then participant i can prove to the other
participants that the dealer is bad. In that case, different from
AVSS and eAVSS-SC, participants expose the dealer’s secret.
The complexities incurred by different participants at differ-
ent steps of the sAVSS protocol instantiated with Kate et al. [1]
are as follows. A dealer provides each of n participants shares
and constant-size commitments on `+1 polynomials. The total
communication complexity is O(`n), or simply O(n) in the
usual case where ` is a (small) constant. Upon each recovery
request, a participant sends a constant amount of information
to the requestor, for a total O(t) communication for t requests.
Finally, each participant requiring share recovery obtains
shares from other participants incurring O(n) communication,
for a total O(tn) communication for t requests.
III. SHARE RECOVERY IN VERIFIABLE SECRET SHARING
In this section, we detail our VSS protocol and its security.
We begin with the definitions of distributed pseudorandom
functions and verifiable secret sharing in Section III-A and
Section III-B, respectively. We will then detail our goals
(Section III-C), further assumptions on which our scheme
builds (Section III-D), our construction (Section III-E) and its
security (Section III-F).
Note that our proofs are applicable to any schemes that
satisfy our descriptions below. Our particular instantiations
are described in Section V. To highlight the generality of
our descriptions, we instantiate our secret sharing scheme
described in Section III-B in two ways [1], [5], of which one
gives us the desired asymptotic complexity while the other
uses more inexpensive cryptographic operations.
A. Distributed Pseudorandom Functions
A distributed pseudorandom function (DPRF) is a pseudo-
random function that requires the cooperation of k replicas
out of n total replicas to evaluate [17]. A DPRF F provides
the following interfaces, where [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
• dprfInit is a randomized procedure that returns a set
of pairs {〈dpk i, dsk i〉}i∈[n] ← dprfInit(1κ, k, n,D,R).
Each dpk i is public key, and each dsk i is its correspond-
ing private key.
• dprfContrib is a randomized procedure that returns a
contribution d ← dprfContrib(dsk i, x) if x ∈ D and
failure (⊥) otherwise.
• dprfVerify is a deterministic procedure that returns a
boolean value. We require that dprfVerify(dpk i, x, d) re-
turns true if d is output from dprfContrib(dsk i, x) with
nonzero probability, for the private key dsk i correspond-
ing to dpk i.
• dprfEval is a deterministic procedure that returns a value
y ← dprfEval(x, {di}i∈I), where y ∈ R, if x ∈ D,
|I| ≥ k and for all i ∈ I , dprfVerify(dpk i, x, di) returns
true. Otherwise, dprfEval(x, {di}i∈I) returns ⊥.
Security for a distributed pseudorandom function is de-
fined as follows. An adversary AF is provided inputs
〈dpk i〉i∈[n], k, n, D, and R, where {〈dpk i, dsk i〉}i∈[n] ←
dprfInit(1κ, k, n,D,R). In addition, AF is given oracle
access to n + 1 oracles. The first n oracles, denoted
〈OF,i〉i∈[n], each supports two types of queries. AF can
invoke OF,i.contrib(x), which returns dprfContrib(dsk i, x),
or it can invoke OF,i.compromise, which returns dsk i. The
last oracle provided to AF is denoted O?F : D → R and
is instantiated as one of two oracles, either OrealF or OrandF .
Oracle OrealF , on input x, selects a subset I ⊆ [n] at random
of size |I| = k, invokes di ← OF,i.contrib(x) for each
i ∈ I , and returns dprfEval(x, {di}i∈I). Oracle OrandF is
instantiated as a function chosen uniformly at random from
the set of all functions from D to R. For any x ∈ D, let Ix
be the oracle indices such that for each i ∈ Ix, AF invokes
OF,i.compromise or OF,i.contrib(x). Then, AF is legitimate
if |Ix| < k for every x for which AF invokes O?F (x). Finally,
AF outputs a bit. We say that the distributed pseudorandom
function is secure if for all legitimate adversaries AF that run
in time polynomial in κ,
P
(
A〈OF,i〉i∈[n],O
real
F
F (〈dpk i〉i∈[n], k, n,D,R) = 1
)
− P
(
A〈OF,i〉i∈[n],O
rand
F
F (〈dpk i〉i∈[n], k, n,D,R) = 1
)
(1)
is negligible in κ.
B. Verifiable Secret Sharing
Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) is a way to share a secret so
that it requires a coalition of k replicas out of n total replicas
in order to reconstruct the secret. A VSS scheme provides the
following interfaces:
• vssInit is a randomized procedure that returns
〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉 ← vssInit(1κ, k, n). Here, q
is a prime of length κ bits. Each vpk i is a public key,
and each vsk i is its corresponding private key.
• vssShare is a randomized procedure that produces
〈c, {ui}i∈[n]〉 ← vssShare(s, q, {vpk i}i∈[n]). Here, s ∈
Zq[x] is a degree k−1 polynomial, and q and {vpk i}i∈[n]
are as output by vssInit. The value c is a commitment, and
each ui is a share.
• vssVerify is a deterministic procedure that returns a
boolean. We require that vssVerify(vpk i, c, ui) return true
if 〈c, ui〉 (i.e., with arbitrary {uiˆ}iˆ 6=i) is output from
vssShare(s, q, {vpk i}i∈[n]) with nonzero probability.
• vssReconstruct is a deterministic procedure that returns
a value s ← vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, ui〉}i∈I) where
s ∈ Zq[x] of degree k − 1, if |I| ≥ k and for all
i ∈ I , vssVerify(vpk i, c, ui) returns true. Otherwise,
vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, ui〉}i∈I) returns ⊥.
The security of a VSS scheme lies in its hiding and binding
properties.
1) Hiding: A hiding adversary AV is provided in-
puts q and {vpk i}i∈[n], where 〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉 ←
vssInit(1κ, k, n), and access to n+1 oracles. The first n oracles
are denoted 〈OV,i〉i∈[n]; each OV,i is initialized with vsk i and
can be invoked as described below. The last oracle provided to
AV is denoted ObV , where b ∈ {0, 1}. AV can invoke this ora-
cle with two inputs s0, s1 ∈ Zq . When invoked, ObV generates
a random sˆ ∈ Zq[x] of degree k − 1 such that sˆ(0) = sb and
performs 〈c, {ui}i∈[n]〉 ← vssShare(sˆ, q, {vpk i}i∈[n]), provid-
ing c to AV and 〈c, ui〉 to OV,i. The oracles 〈OV,i〉i∈[n] can
be invoked by AV as follows. AV can invoke OV,i.contrib(c),
which returns the share ui provided to OV,i with commitment
c by ObV . AV can also invoke OV,i.compromise, which returns
vsk i and all 〈c, ui〉 pairs received from ObV . For any c, let Ic
be the oracle indices such that for each i ∈ Ic, AV invokes
OV,i.compromise or OV,i.contrib(c). Then, AV is legitimate
if |Ic| < k for every c. Finally, AV outputs a bit. We say that
the VSS V is hiding if for all legitimate adversaries AV that
run in time polynomial in κ,
P
(
A〈OV,i〉i∈[n],O
1
V
V (q, {vpk i}i∈[n]) = 1
)
− P
(
A〈OV,i〉i∈[n],O
0
V
V (q, {vpk i}i∈[n]) = 1
) (2)
is negligible in κ.
2) Binding: A binding adversary AV is provided inputs
〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉 ← vssInit(1κ, k, n). AV outputs c,
{ui}i∈I and {uˆi}i∈Iˆ . We say that VSS V is binding if for
all binding adversaries AV that run in time polynomial in κ,
P
 vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, ui〉}i∈I) = s∧ vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, uˆi〉}i∈Iˆ) = sˆ
∧ s 6= ⊥ ∧ sˆ 6= ⊥ ∧ s 6= sˆ

is negligible in κ, where the probability is taken with respect
to random choices made in vssInit and by AV .
C. Goals
Given such a VSS scheme V and a DPRF F , our goal is
to construct a new VSS scheme V∗ that provides the vssInit,
vssShare, vssVerify, and vssReconstruct algorithms (denoted
vssInit∗, vssShare∗, vssVerify∗ and vssReconstruct∗ for V∗,
respectively) as defined in Section III-A, as well as three more
algorithms, denoted vssRecoverContrib∗, vssRecoverVerify∗,
and vssRecover∗. We allow the vssShare∗ algorithm to accept
additional arguments (a set of private keys for a DPRF)
and to return an additional value r that is provided as
input to all procedures except for vssInit∗. The algorithms
vssRecoverContrib∗, vssRecoverVerify∗, and vssRecover∗ to-
gether permit a replica to recover its share from other replicas,
and behave as follows:
• vssRecoverContrib∗ is a randomized procedure that re-
turns v∗i ← vssRecoverContrib∗(c∗, r, vsk∗i , u∗i , iˆ) where
v∗i is a recovery share with properties described below.
• vssRecoverVerify∗ is a deterministic procedure that
returns a boolean. vssRecoverVerify∗(c∗, r, v∗i , vpk
∗
i , iˆ)
must return true if v∗i is output from
vssRecoverContrib∗(c∗, r, vsk∗i , u
∗
i , iˆ) with nonzero
probability and vssVerify∗(vpk∗i , c
∗, r, u∗i ) returns true.
• vssRecover∗ is a deterministic procedure that returns
u∗
iˆ
← vssRecover∗(c∗, r, {〈vpk∗i , v∗i 〉}i∈I , iˆ, vpk∗iˆ ) if
|I| ≥ k, vssRecoverVerify∗(c∗, r, v∗i , vpk∗i , iˆ) returns true
for all i ∈ I , and vssVerify∗(vpk∗
iˆ
, c∗, r, u∗
iˆ
) returns true.
Otherwise, vssRecover∗(c∗, r, {〈vpk∗i , v∗i 〉}i∈I , iˆ, vpk∗iˆ )
returns ⊥.
Due to the additional interfaces above, we change the
definition of hiding security as follows. Each oracle OV∗,i
additionally supports a query OV∗,i.recover(c∗, iˆ) that re-
turns v∗i ← vssRecoverContrib∗(c∗, r, vsk∗i , u∗i , iˆ). For any
c∗, let Ic∗ be the oracle indices such that for each i ∈
Ic∗ , AV∗ invokes OV∗,i.compromise, OV∗,i.contrib(c∗), or
{OV∗ ,ˆi.recover(c∗, i)}iˆ∈Iˆ where |Iˆ| ≥ k. Then, AV∗ is
legitimate if |Ic∗ | < k for every c∗.
D. Assumptions on Underlying VSS
Our construction combines an existing VSS scheme
with a DPRF for which, if 〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉 ←
vssInit(1κ, k, n), then R = Zq and each share ui output from
vssShare is in Zq . In addition, we require that the VSS offer
additional procedures, as follows.
• There is a procedure vssMakeSecret that creates
s← vssMakeSecret(q, {〈xi, yi〉}i∈I)
where s ∈ Zq[x] is of degree |I|, and so that if
〈c, {ui}i∈[n]〉 ← vssShare(s, q, {vpk i}i∈[n])
then ui = yi for any i ∈ I .
• There is a procedure vssCombineCommitments such that
if
vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, ui〉}i∈I) = s
vssReconstruct(cˆ, {〈vpk i, uˆi〉}i∈I) = sˆ
where s, sˆ 6= ⊥, and if
cˇ← vssCombineCommitments(c, cˆ)
then
vssReconstruct(cˇ, {〈vpk i, (ui + uˆi)〉}i∈I) = s+ sˆ
An example of such a scheme is that due to Kate et al. [1].
E. VSS Scheme with Recovery
Below we describe the procedures that make up the VSS
scheme V∗. The algorithms are expressed in terms of constants
n (the number of replicas), k (the reconstruction threshold),
and ` = dn/(k − 1)e. Each share u∗i and commitment c∗ is
a zero-indexed vector of ` + 1 elements. We denote the j-th
element of each by u∗i [j] and c
∗[j], respectively, for 0 ≤ j ≤ `.
Line numbers below refer to Figure 1.
vssInit∗ initializes the underlying VSS V in line 2, as well
as a DPRF F in line 3. The public key vpk∗i for replica i
consists of its public key vpk i for V and its public key dpk i
for F (line 7) and similarly for the private key vsk∗i (line 6).
vssShare∗ is modified to take in all of the private keys
{dsk i}i∈[n] for the DPRF F , as well as the other arguments
included in its definition in Section III-B. (For this reason,
our construction requires each dealer to have a distinct set
of parameters for its sharings, i.e., produced by its own call
to vssInit∗.) This enables the dealer to evaluate F itself,
which it does on 〈r, i〉 for each i ∈ [n] (lines 10–12),
where r is a new, random κ-bit nonce (line 9). The resulting
values {yi}i∈[n] are divided into ` groups of size k − 1,
each group being used to construct a set of k − 1 points
Pointsj ← {〈i, yi〉 | (j − 1)(k − 1) < i ≤ j(k − 1)} (line 14)
on which vssMakeSecret is invoked (line 15). The resulting
sj ∈ Zq[x] is then shared using V (line 16). Recall that by
the definition of vssMakeSecret, each u∗i [j] thus produced
satisfies u∗i [j] = yi. Of course, the input secret s is also
shared (line 17). The results of these sharings are grouped
according to replica index i and returned as u∗i for each i ∈ [n],
along with all of the sharing commitments c∗ and the nonce
r (line 18).
vssVerify∗ and vssReconstruct∗ operate in the natural way.
vssVerify∗ verifies the commitment c∗[0] and share u∗i [0]
(line 21) produced in the sharing of s, as well as verifying
the commitment c∗[j] and share u∗i [j] (line 28) produced in
the sharing of sj . In addition, it verifies (intuitively) that
u∗i [j] = yi (line 25). The latter two verifications are skipped
if u∗i [1] = ⊥ (line 23), which occurs if the share u∗i was
recovered (see below). In this case, u∗i [j] = ⊥ for all j ∈ [`]
(or should be, and so any j ∈ [`] for which u∗i [j] 6= ⊥ is
just ignored). vssReconstruct∗ simply uses vssVerify∗ to verify
each share u∗i provided as input (line 33) and then submits
c∗[0] and the inputs {〈vpk i, u∗i [0]〉}i∈I to vssReconstruct to
reconstruct s (line 36).
vssRecoverContrib∗(c∗, r, vsk∗i , u
∗
i , iˆ) is invoked at replica
i to construct its contribution to enable replica iˆ to reconstruct
its share u∗
iˆ
. vssRecoverContrib∗ returns u∗i [0] blinded by u
∗
i [j]
(line 41) where j ← dˆi/(k − 1)e. Then, so that replica iˆ can
recover its share of the original secret, replica i also returns
its share of the DPRF scheme F evaluated at 〈r, iˆ〉 (line 39).
vssRecoverVerify∗(c∗, r, v∗i , vpk
∗
i , iˆ) is executed by replica
iˆ to verify that replica i performed vssRecoverContrib∗
correctly. The output of vssRecoverContrib∗ contributed by
replica i is passed into vssRecoverVerify∗ as v∗i and is
parsed into its constituent components in line 44. First, the
DPRF contribution di is checked on line 46 to ensure that
it corresponds to a correct evaluation of the DPRF scheme
F at the point 〈r, iˆ〉. vssRecoverVerify∗ then combines the
commitments (line 48) and uses vssVerify (line 49) to check
that the blinded share u was created correctly. If both checks
pass, then vssRecoverVerify∗ returns true.
vssRecover∗(c∗, r, {〈vpk∗i , v∗i 〉}i∈I , iˆ, vpk∗iˆ ) is executed at
replica iˆ to recover its share u∗
iˆ
. In particular, u∗
iˆ
[0] will be
a share of the original polynomial for iˆ. vssRecover∗ first
invokes vssRecoverVerify∗ to make sure that the share sent
by each replica i ∈ I is correct (line 55). vssRecover∗ then
leverages vssReconstruct (line 60) to reconstruct a polynomial
s ∈ Zq[x] that is the sum of the polynomial originally shared
in vssShare∗ that resulted in commitment c∗[0] and the j-
th masking polynomial sj that resulted in commitment c∗[j],
where j = dˆi/(k − 1)e. vssRecover∗ then evaluates s(ˆi) and
subtracts sj (ˆi) = dprfEval(〈r, iˆ〉, {di}i∈I) (lines 60–62) to
obtain u∗
iˆ
[0].
F. Security
Below, we prove that our modified VSS scheme still satisfies
the security properties guaranteed by the underlying VSS
protocol.
a) Hiding: Suppose that the underlying DPRF scheme
F and VSS scheme V are secure, and let AV∗ be a hiding
adversary for V∗. We claim that if AV∗ is legitimate, then
for any commitment c∗, the set of indices I for which AV∗
obtains the shares {u∗i [0]}i∈I produced in line 17 (i.e., in its
invocation of ObV∗ that returned c∗) satisfies |I| < k. To see
why, note that AV∗ can obtain u∗i [0] for any i in one of three
ways: (i) by invoking OV∗,i.compromise; (ii) by invoking
OV∗,i.contrib(c∗); or (iii) by invoking OV∗ ,ˆi.recover(c∗, i) at
each iˆ ∈ Iˆ where |Iˆ| ≥ k, in which case AV∗ can recover u∗i [0]
using the vssRecover∗ routine (line 62). Critically, invoking
OV∗ ,ˆi.recover(c∗, i) at each iˆ ∈ Iˆ where |Iˆ| < k yields no
useful information about u∗i [0], since when |Iˆ| < k, the value
yi (line 61) and so u∗i [0] = s(i) − yi (line 62) cannot be
predicted nonnegligibly better than guessing it at random, due
to the security of the DPRF F (i.e., (1)). Because AV∗ is
legitimate, it thus obtains u∗i [0] for only fewer than k values
of i, and so by the security of V , its success (in the sense of
(2)) is negligible in κ.
b) Binding: A binding adversary AV∗ is provided inputs
〈q, {〈vpk∗i , vsk∗i 〉}i∈[n]〉 ← vssInit∗(1κ, k, n), and succeeds if
it outputs c∗, {u∗i }i∈I and {uˆ∗i }i∈Iˆ for which
vssReconstruct∗(c∗, r, {〈vpk∗i , u∗i 〉}i∈I) = s
∧ vssReconstruct∗(c∗, r, {〈vpk∗i , uˆ∗i 〉}i∈Iˆ) = sˆ
∧ s 6= ⊥ ∧ sˆ 6= ⊥ ∧ s 6= sˆ
Let s and sˆ be values satisfying this condition. Then,
s = vssReconstruct(c∗[0], {〈vpk i, u∗i [0]〉}i∈I)
sˆ = vssReconstruct(c∗[0], {〈vpk i, u∗i [0]〉}i∈Iˆ)
where 〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉 ← vssInit(1κ, k, n) (see lines 2
and 36). That is, breaking binding for V∗ implies breaking
binding for V , and so if V ensures the binding property, then
so does V∗.
IV. A PRIVATE, BYZANTINE FAULT-TOLERANT
KEY-VALUE STORE
In this section we describe how to incorporate sAVSS into
PBFT [6]. PBFT works with arbitrary applications, but for
simplicity, we will use a simple application that captures how
1: procedure vssInit∗(1κ, k, n)
2: 〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉 ← vssInit(1κ, k, n)
3: 〈{〈dpk i, dsk i〉}i∈[n]〉 ← dprfInit(1κ, k, n, {0, 1}κ × [n],Zq)
4: for i ∈ [n] do
5: vpk∗i ← 〈vpk i, dpk i〉
6: vsk∗i ← 〈vsk i, dsk i〉
7: return 〈q, {〈vpk∗i , vsk∗i 〉}i∈[n]〉
8: procedure vssShare∗(s, q, {dsk i}i∈[n], {vpk∗i }i∈[n])
9: r $← {0, 1}κ
10: for i ∈ [n] do
11: 〈vpk i, dpk i〉 ← vpk∗i
12: yi ← dprfEval(〈r, i〉, {dprfContrib(dsk iˆ, 〈r, i〉)}iˆ∈[n])
13: for j ∈ [`] do
14: Pointsj ← {〈i, yi〉 | (j − 1)(k − 1) < i ≤ j(k − 1)}
15: sj ← vssMakeSecret(q,Pointsj)
16: 〈c∗[j], {u∗i [j]}i∈[n]〉 ← vssShare(sj , q, {vpk i}i∈[n])
17: 〈c∗[0], {u∗i [0]}i∈[n]〉 ← vssShare(s, q, {vpk i}i∈[n])
18: return 〈c∗, r, {u∗i }i∈[n]〉
19: procedure vssVerify∗(vpk∗i , c∗, r, u∗i )
20: 〈vpk i, dpk i〉 ← vpk∗i
21: if vssVerify(vpk i, c∗[0], u∗i [0]) = false then
22: return false
23: if u∗i [1] 6= ⊥ then
24: j ← di/(k − 1)e
25: if dprfVerify(dpk i, 〈r, i〉, u∗i [j]) = false then
26: return false
27: for j ∈ [`] do
28: if vssVerify(vpk i, c∗[j], u∗i [j]) = false then
29: return false
30: return true
31: procedure vssReconstruct∗(c∗, r, {〈vpk∗i , u∗i 〉}i∈I)
32: for i ∈ I do
33: if vssVerify∗(vpk∗i , c∗, r, u∗i ) = false then
34: return ⊥
35: 〈vpk i, dpk i〉 ← vpk∗i
36: return vssReconstruct(c∗[0], {〈vpk i, u∗i [0]〉}i∈I)
37: procedure vssRecoverContrib∗(c∗, r, vsk∗i , u∗i , iˆ)
38: 〈vsk i, dsk i〉 ← vsk∗i
39: di ← dprfContrib(dsk i, 〈r, iˆ〉)
40: j ← dˆi/(k − 1)e
41: return 〈di, (u∗i [0] + u∗i [j])〉
42: procedure vssRecoverVerify∗(c∗, r, v∗i , vpk
∗
i , iˆ)
43: j ← dˆi/(k − 1)e
44: 〈di, u〉 ← v∗i
45: 〈vpk i, dpk i〉 ← vpk∗i
46: if dprfVerify(dpk i, 〈r, iˆ〉, di) = false then
47: return false
48: c← vssCombineCommitments(c∗[0], c∗[j])
49: if vssVerify(vpk i, c, u) = false then
50: return false
51: return true
52: procedure vssRecover∗(c∗, r, {〈vpk∗i , v∗i 〉}i∈I , iˆ, vpk∗iˆ )
53: j ← dˆi/(k − 1)e
54: for i ∈ I do
55: if vssRecoverVerify∗(c∗, r, v∗i , vpk
∗
i , iˆ) = false then
56: return ⊥
57: 〈di, ui〉 ← v∗i
58: 〈vpk i, dpk i〉 ← vpk∗i
59: c← vssCombineCommitments(c∗[0], c∗[j])
60: s← vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, ui〉}i∈I)
61: yiˆ ← dprfEval(〈r, iˆ〉, {di}i∈I)
62: u∗
iˆ
← 〈(s(ˆi)− yiˆ),⊥, . . . ,⊥〉
63: if vssVerify∗(vpk∗
iˆ
, c∗, r, u∗
iˆ
) = false then
64: return ⊥
65: return u∗
iˆ
Fig. 1: Pseudocode for our verifiable secret sharing scheme
secret values are handled in our PBFT extension: a private,
replicated key/value service that tolerates Byzantine faults
of replicas. The service provides two APIs, PUT(k, v) and
GET(k), by which a client can write a value to a key or read
a value previously written to a key. The correctness of the
value read from a key is ensured despite up to f Byzantine-
faulty replicas, and values are also kept private from f faulty
replicas, using our verifiable secret-sharing approach. Similar
to previous works (e.g., [18], [19]), a client shares a secret
value directly among the replicas, and a consensus protocol
drives agreement on a verifiable digest of the value.
Our design assumes a classical asynchronous Byzantine
model. Specifically, we have n = 3f + 1 replicas, ≤ f of
which are Byzantine. Any entity that sends a request into the
system is a client and in particular, clients and replicas may not
be distinct. Any client may be Byzantine, but our guarantees
are only defined with respect to honest clients. The network is
assumed to be asynchronous, but will eventually go through
periods of synchrony in which messages are delivered within
a known time bound and correct replicas and clients make
progress at a known rate. We assume that each message is
signed by its sender so that its origin is known, subject to
standard cryptographic assumptions.
We represent the state of the replicated service as a key-
value store. Every client in the system is allowed to view all
keys in the store. However, the service maintains a (potentially
dynamic) access control policy that specifies for every client
the values it is allowed to open. Under these assumptions, we
provide the standard guarantees provided by a Byzantine fault
tolerant protocol:
• Linearizability [20]. If a client sends a request to the
replicated service, then the service’s response is consis-
tent with an execution where the client’s request was
executed instantaneously at some point between when the
request was sent and the response was received.
• Liveness. If the network is synchronous, then every client
request will get a response.
In addition to these standard properties, our design offers
the following privacy property:
• Privacy. A value written to a key by a correct client
where the access-control policy prohibits access by any
faulty client, remains hidden from f Byzantine servers.
A. Setup and Log
In addition to setting up authenticated communication chan-
nels among all parties, in a setup phase, vssInit∗ is called for
every client in the system and is part of the public/private key
infrastructure. The client takes the role of the dealer in vssInit∗
while each replica takes the role of a participant. In particular,
each client knows the secret key for all replicas corresponding
to its invocation of vssInit∗.
Every replica stores a full copy of the K-V store. For each
key there are two value entries, a public value (keyed K-
pub) and a private value (keyed K-priv). A replica maintains
a bounded log of pending commands, waiting to be committed.
The size of the log cannot grow beyond a certain system-wide
parameter W . Once an entry in the log becomes committed, it
is applied to the K-V store. No replica or leader starts handling
slot j +W in the sequence of commands before it learns that
2f+1 replicas have committed all commands up to j. When a
replica learns that all commands up to j have been committed
by 2f + 1 replicas, it evicts them from the log.
B. Views
Our solution employs a classical framework [6], [21] that
revolves around an explicit ranking among proposals via view
numbers. Replicas all start with an initial view, and progress
from one view to the next. They accept requests and respond
to messages only in their current view.
In each view there is a single designated leader. In a
view, zero or more decisions may be reached. This strategy
separates safety from liveness: It maintains safety even if the
system exhibits arbitrary communication delays and again up
to f Byzantine failures; it provides progress during periods of
synchrony.
If a sufficient number of replicas suspect that the leader is
faulty, then a view change occurs and a new leader is elected.
The mechanism to trigger moving to a higher view is of no
significance for safety, but it is crucial for liveness.
C. Common Mode Protocol
A client put is split into two parts, public and private. The
public part is concerned with setting sequence ordering of
requests. The private part stores a private value.
More specifically, in a put(K,V ) request, the client pri-
vately shares V by via vssShare∗, and sends the corresponding
shares to every replica in the system. The public part of
put(K,V ) consists of a client sending a put(K, cV ) request
to the current leader. cV is a global commitment to the
polynomial s that binds the shares of each replica as a
verifiable valid share of s).
The leader waits until its local log has length < W . It then
extends its local log with the put request, and sends a pre-
prepare (ordering-request) containing its log tail. We discuss
below the protocol for a leader to pick an initial log when
starting a new view.
A replica accepts a pre-prepare from the leader of the
current view if it has valid format, if it extends any previous
pre-prepare from this leader, if its log has fewer than W
pending entries, and if the replica received a valid share
corresponding to c. If the leader pre-prepare message has a
valid format, but the replica did not receive the corresponding
client
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wait
wait
prepare commit put	ACKpre-prepare
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Fig. 2: put commmon mode
share for it, it starts a timer for share-recovery (see more
below).
Upon accepting a pre-prepare, a replica extends its local log
to include the new request and broadcasts a prepare message
to all replicas that includes the new log tail. Replicas wait to
collect a commit-certificate, a set of 2f + 1 prepare responses
for the current log tail. Then the replica broadcasts a commit
message carrying the commit-certificate to the other replicas.
A decision is reached in a view on a new log tail when 2f+1
distinct replica have sent a commit message for it.
When a replica learns that a put(K,V ) request has been
committed to the log, it inserts to its local key-value store two
entries, a global entry ((K||public), cV ) containing the global
commitment to V , and a private entry ((K||private), share)
containing the replica’s private share. The replica then re-
sponds to the client with an put acknowledgement message
containing K and c. A client waits to receive 2f + 1 put
responses to complete the request. Figure 2a depicts the put
io path, and Figure 2b the put io path when shares are missed.
The client get(K) protocol consists of sending the get
request to the current leader. The pre-prepare, prepare and
commit phases of the ordering protocol are carried as above,
without the need to wait for shares. At the final stage, when
a replica executes the get requests, it returns its share to
the client in a response. If the replica is missing its share,
it initiates the share-recovery protocol. The client waits to
receive f + 1 valid get responses. It uses vssVerify∗ to verify
each response, and vssReconstruct∗ to reconstruct the secret
value from the responses.
D. Share-Recovery Protocol
There are several circumstances in the protocol when a
replica discovers it is missing its private share of a re-
quest and needs to recover it (see above). To initiate share-
recovery, a replica broadcasts a recovery request. Other repli-
cas respond to a share-recovery request with the output of
vssRecoverContrib∗. After receiving a response, the original
replica uses vssRecoverVerify∗ to check the response. If the
response is valid, it is stored and if it is invalid, it is dropped.
When it receives f + 1 valid responses, the replica uses
vssRecover∗ to recover its missing secret share.
E. Common mode performance
The common mode protocol incurs the following perfor-
mance costs. The client interaction with the BFT replicated
service is linear, since it needs to populate all replicas with
shares. Additionally, the client collects f + 1 responses from
servers.
The communication among the replicas to achieve an order-
ing decision is quadratic. There are several practical variants
of BFT replication that achieve linear communication during
periods of synchrony and when a leader is non-faulty (e.g., [8],
[22], [23]) These improvements are left outside the scope of
this paper, however, our linear AVSS protocol is designed
so it can be incorporated within them without increasing the
asymptotic complexity of the common mode.
In terms of latency, the sharing protocol is non-interactive
and single-round, hence it can be performed concurrently
with the leader broadcast. Recovery incurs extra latency since
each replica must ask at least f + 1 correct replicas for
their contribution. In the original BFT protocol, recovering a
missing request only requires asking 1 correct replica for the
request data. In both cases, the recovery protocol is interactive
and single-round, so there are no asymptotic increases in
latency. However, in practice, there will be a difference in
latency between the two scenarios.
Remaining Items. For completeness, we describe the view
change and state transfer protocols in Appendix B. A proof of
linearizability, liveness and privacy appears in Appendix A.
V. INSTANTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
We first see how to instantiate our distributed pseudorandom
function using the techniques presented in Naor, et al. [17].
We then cover two ways to instantiate our verifiable scheme,
using Pedersen secret sharing [5] and one from Kate, et
al. [1]. Finally, we go over implementation details and the
programming API that we expose for application developers.
A. Distributed Pseudorandom Function Instantiation
Our distributed pseudorandom function F consists of four
algorithms: dprfInit, dprfContrib, dprfVerify, and dprfEval.
Our implementation defines them as follows:
• dprfInit(1κ, k, n,D,Zq), first chooses a generator h of
G of order q. A k out of n secret sharing of a private
value α ∈ Zq is produced using Shamir secret shar-
ing [9], of which the shares are {αi}i∈[n]. dpk iˆ is set
to 〈h, hα, {hαi}i∈[n]〉 for all iˆ = 1..n. dsk iˆ is set to αiˆ
for all iˆ = 1..n. dprfInit outputs {〈dpk i, dsk i〉}i∈[n].
• dprfContrib(dsk i, x) first computes fi(x) = H(x)αi
where H : {0, 1}∗ → G is a hash function that is
modeled as a random oracle. Here, αi is obtained from
the dsk i. Let r be a randomly generated element of Zq′ .
Then, we let ci ← H ′(H(x), h, fi(x), hαi , H(x)r, hr),
where H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → Zq is a hash function modeled as a
random oracle. We set zi ← αici+r mod q. dprfContrib
then outputs 〈fi(x), zi, ci〉.
• dprfVerify(dpk i, x, d) first extracts fi(x), ci, and zi
from d. Then, h and hαi are extracted from
dpk i. Finally, dprfVerify returns true if ci =
H ′(H(x), h, fi(x), hαi , H(x)zifi(x)−ci , hzi(hαi)−ci).
• dprfEval(x, {di}i∈I) first verifies each di using
dprfVerify. If any of the verifications returns false,
then dprfEval returns ⊥. Otherwise, we extract fi(x)
values from each di. Since the exponents of fi(x) were
shared in the exponent using Shamir secret sharing,
dprfEval uses Lagrange interpolation in the exponent to
get the value of F at x, hashes it into an element of Zq
and ouputs that value.
B. Verifiable Secret Sharing Instantiations
For a verifiable secret sharing scheme, we require the
functions vssInit, vssShare, vssVerify, and vssReconstruct. To
be used in our construction, we require a few additional func-
tions, namely: vssMakeSecret and vssCombineCommitments.
To support addition, we simply require replicas to add the
respective shares, by definition of vssCombineCommitments.
We now define all of these functions for two secret sharing
schemes.
1) Pedersen Secret Sharing: We describe how to fit the
secret sharing scheme from Pedersen [5] into our framework.
• vssInit(1κ, k, n) first chooses a safe prime q = 2q′ + 1
at least κ bits in length, for q′ a prime. Also, we let g
and h be two distinct generators of the quadratic residues
QR(Z∗q) of Z∗q such that logg(h) is unknown. Then, vpk i
is set to 〈g, h〉 for all i. vsk i is set to ⊥ for all i. The
return value of vssInit is 〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉.
• vssShare(s, q, {vpk i}i∈[n]) first extracts the public key
and gets g and h as defined in vssInit. Set sj be the
coefficient of the xj term in s and s(i) be the evaluation
of s at point i. Pick t ∈ Zq[x] to be a random polynomial
of degree k−1. Similarly, we let tj be the coefficient of xj
term in t and t(i) be the evaluation of t at point i. Now,
we set ui to be 〈s(i), t(i)〉. Here, all linear operations
on ui values are just done element-wise. Set c to be
{gsjhtj}j∈[k]. Then, vssShare returns 〈c, {ui}i∈[n]〉.
• vssVerify(vpk i, c, ui) first extracts {gsjhtj}j∈[k] from c.
Then, s(i), t(i) is extracted from ui. We return true if
gs(i)ht(i) =
∏k−1
j=0 (g
sjhtj )i
j
and false otherwise.
• vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, ui〉}i∈I) first calls
vssVerify(vpk i, c, ui) for all i ∈ I . If all of vssVerify calls
return true, then we continue. Otherwise, vssReconstruct
returns ⊥. Then, we extract s(i), t(i) from each ui.
Finally, we simply do a Lagrange interpolation in order
to identify the unique degree k − 1 polynomial in Zq[x]
that goes through the points (i, s(i)) for all i ∈ I and
return that value.
• vssMakeSecret(q, {〈xi, yi〉}i∈I) does a Lagrange inter-
polation in order to identify the unique degree k − 1
polynomial in Zq[x] that goes through (xi, yi) and returns
that as s.
• vssCombineCommitments(c, cˆ) extracts {gsjhtj}j∈[k]
from c and {gsˆjhtˆj}j∈[k] from cˆ. Then, it returns cˇ =
{(gsˆjhtˆj )(gsjhtj )}j∈[k].
2) Kate et al. Secret Sharing: We describe how to fit the
secret sharing scheme from Kate et al. [1] into our framework.
Note that this secret sharing scheme also has a witness, which
proves that a particular share is consistent with the polynomial
commitment. Witnesses are additively homomorphic as well
and can be manipulated the same way as the shares can. In
particular, we can perform polynomial interpolation in order
to take a set of f witnesses and obtain the witness for any
other share. Additionally, we only need to send a witness when
we transmit the corresponding share. Thus, witnesses only
increase the communication overhead by a constant factor. In
the description below, we assume that we have the witness
corresponding to each share.
• vssInit(1κ, k, n) first chooses a safe prime q at least κ bits
in length. Then, we initialize two groups of order q: G
and Gt such that there exists a bilinear map e : G×G →
Gt. We then generate a τ ∈ Zq and pick a generator
g ∈ G. Set vpk i to be 〈G,Gt, e, g, {gτ
j}j∈[f ]〉 and vsk i
to be ⊥ for all i. Then, we delete τ . Finally, vssInit returns
〈q, {〈vpk i, vsk i〉}i∈[n]〉.
• vssShare(s, q, {vpk i}i∈[n]) first extracts the public key
and gets g and {gτj}j∈[f ]. Let sj be the coefficient of the
xj term in s and s(i) be the evaluation of s at point i.
We now compute gs(τ) by computing
∏f
j=0(g
τj )sj and
assign it to c. Now, using polynomial division, we can
compute the coefficients of s(x)−s(i)x−i , which will allow us
to compute g
s(τ)−s(i)
τ−i which is the witness for ui. We also
set ui to be s(i). Finally, vssShare returns 〈c, {ui}i∈[n]〉.
• vssVerify(vpk i, c, ui) first extracts g
s(τ) from c, s(i) from
ui, and e, g, gτ from vpk i. We also have access to
the value g
s(τ)−s(i)
τ−i since the witness for the share is
transmitted along with the share. Then, vssVerify returns
true if e(gs(τ), g) equals e(g
s(τ)−s(i)
τ−i , g
τ
gi )e(g, g)
s(i) and
false otherwise.
• vssReconstruct(c, {〈vpk i, ui〉}i∈I) first calls
vssVerify(vpk i, c, ui) for all i ∈ I . If all of vssVerify calls
return true, then we continue. Otherwise, vssReconstruct
returns ⊥. Then, similarly to the Pedersen scheme, we
extract s(i) from each ui and do Lagrange interpolation
to identify the original polynomial and return that value.
• vssMakeSecret(q, {〈xi, yi〉}i∈I) works the same way as
it does in the Pedersen scheme above.
• vssCombineCommitments(c, cˆ) first extracts gs(τ) from c
and gsˆ(τ) from cˆ. We then set cˇ to (gsτ )(gsˆ(τ)) and return
that value.
C. Implementation
We implement a secret shared BFT engine by layering
PBFT [6] with our secret sharing scheme. Our implementation
consists of 4700 lines of Python and 4800 lines of C. We opti-
mize our design for multicore environments, with one network
thread running on a core which never blocks. Additionally,
we use one thread for every other core in order to do all
cryptographic operations that are required by PBFT and our
secret sharing scheme. We use elliptic curve signatures with
the secp256k1 library for all signature checking operations and
the Relic library [24] for all other cryptographic operations
related to our scheme. We also make a few optimizations for
the Kate and Pedersen secret sharing schemes in order to make
them faster.
a) Kate et al.: Kate et al.’s secret sharing scheme lends
itself for extensive caching during setup time. Once the powers
gτ
j
are known for all j, we construct precomputation tables
for each coefficient so that all exponentiations during runtime
leverage these tables for efficiency. In the sharing step, we
first use the well known Horner’s method to optimize the share
evaluation. However, we also note that each intermediate value
obtained in Horner’s method when evaluating s(i) is also the
coefficient of the quotient polynomial s(x)−s(i)x−i which means
that we can do the necessary division required for free before
using our precomputation tables to evaluate the quotient at τ .
In the share verification step, we note that every verification
requires the value of e(g, g) so we can precompute that as well
to save a bilinear map operation. Also in the share verification
phase, we note that the division of g
τ
gi only has n possible
values which means that we can precompute all of these
values as well. Finally, when doing Lagrange interpolation,
we know that the indices range from 0 to n − 1 and in the
denominator, we need to compute the produce of differences
of these indices. Thus, to avoid taking inverses, we simply
take inverses of all n values of the differences which means
that during runtime, we only have to do multiplications.
b) Pedersen: Pedersen’s secret sharing scheme does not
lend itself to as much caching since most of the values are un-
known beforehand. However, we do generate precomputation
tables for both g and h during setup and compute the inverses
to make Lagrange interpolation easier.
VI. EVALUATION
Our evaluation seeks to answer two basic questions. First,
we investigate the costs of each API call in our secret sharing
scheme. Then, we look at how expensive it is to incorporate
our secret sharing scheme into a Byzantine Fault Tolerant key
value store. We instantiate sAVSS using the DPRF in Naor
et al. [17] and two different VSS schemes: Pedersen’s VSS
scheme [5] and Kate et al.’s VSS scheme [1]. We call the
Pedersen instantiation Ped-sAVSS and the Kate et al. instan-
tiation KZG-sAVSS. Note that the latter scheme has constant
overhead on the replicas per sharing, while Ped sAVSS has
linear overhead on the replicas but with cheaper cryptographic
operations. We instantiate the BFT algorithm using PBFT [6]
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Fig. 3: vssShare∗ performance with varying n
and build a Byzantine Fault Tolerant key value store with
secret shared state.
Our implementation uses the Relic [24] cryptographic li-
brary and, for our elliptic-curve algorithms, the BN_P254
curve.
A. Microbenchmarks
For our microbenchmarks, we evaluate each function in our
full asynchronous verifiable secret sharing scheme. We vary
the number of replicas from 4 to 211 and measure the latency
and throughput of each operation. We use EC2 c5.xlarge
instances in order to run our microbenchmarks, which have 4
virtual CPUs per instance.
The module that implements our secret sharing scheme
optimizes for throughput, while compromising slightly on
latency. Each API call runs on a single core; the task is run to
completion and the result is returned in the order that the tasks
were enqueud. This maximizes for throughput due to the lack
of cross core communication, but at the expense of request
latency as many of the underlying cryptographic operations
can leverage multicore environments to execute faster.
Each microbenchmark ran for at least 60 seconds and
collected at least 30 samples. Before computing the final
statistic, we ignored any requests that were completed in the
first 10 seconds and the last 10 seconds of the run. We report
the aggregate throughput during the run and the mean and
standard deviation of the latency of each request completed in
our run.
1) vssShare∗ Microbenchmark: Figure 3a shows that Ped-
sAVSS can sustain more sharings per second than KZG-sAVSS
for all cluster sizes. At n = 4, Ped-sAVSS does 1.2 times
more sharings per second than KZG-sAVSS. However, this
difference increases as the cluster size increases, with Ped-
sAVSS sustaining 58 times more sharings per second than
KZG-sAVSS at n = 199.
Fig. 4: Volume the dealer
transmits per replica to share
a secret among n replicas
This performance differ-
ence between Ped-sAVSS
and KZG-sAVSS is due to
the underlying VSS scheme.
KZG-sAVSS computes wit-
nesses for each share, which
involves evaluating a poly-
nomial in the elliptic curve
group. Additionally, we see
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Fig. 5: vssVerify∗ performance with varying n
that the throughput decrease
is quadratic since evaluating
each share (or witness) takes
O(n) CPU time and there are
n shares so vssShare∗ takes O(n2) time for both KZG-sAVSS
and Ped-sAVSS. For the above reasons, we also see that KZG-
sAVSS has a higher latency than Ped-sAVSS as we see in
Figure 3b. This discrepancy also increases as the size of the
cluster increases.
Figure 4 shows the size of the share and associated metadata
that is sent to each replica after the client computes a share,
which is equal to the disk space that the replica needs to store
a secret shared value. Since Ped-sAVSS has a linear overhead
per sharing to each replica, we see the bandwidth and storage
footprint increasing linearly with the cluster size. Ped-sAVSS
requires about 1KB of storage at n = 4 and increases to
23KB at n = 211. Meanwhile, KZG-sAVSS only requires
each replica to store 860 bytes of information irrespective of
the cluster size. Note that, in both instances, we are storing a
single 254 bit integer.
2) vssVerify∗ Microbenchmark: Figure 5 shows that the
throughput and latency of verifying a share, which is done
by the replicas upon receiving a share. We see that at n = 4,
Ped-sAVSS has 12 times higher throughput and 38 times lower
latency. At n = 211, Ped-sAVSS only outperforms KZG-
sAVSS by a factor of 5.4 on throughput and is only 5.4 times
faster. We also see another trend: KZG-sAVSS’s latency and
throughput stays constant at 117 operations per second with a
350 millisecond mean latency irrespective of the cluster size.
Meanwhile, Ped-sAVSS’s throughput decreases and latency
increases as the number of replicas in the cluster increases. We
see that KZG-sAVSS asympotically is better than Ped-sAVSS,
but Ped-sAVSS’s cheaper cryptographic operations still causes
it to outperform KZG-sAVSS.
3) vssReconstruct∗ Microbenchmark: vssReconstruct∗ has
almost identical performance between KZG-sAVSS and Ped-
sAVSS, as we see in Figure 6. vssReconstruct∗ does not
include the time taken to run vssVerify∗ since share verifica-
tion happens when the message itself is verified. Figure 6a
shows that vssReconstruct∗ can occur at high throughput,
with 45000 operations per second with 4 replicas. However,
vssReconstruct∗’s throughput drops off quadratically as the
cluster size increases, only being able to do 1100 operations
per second with n = 211 replicas. Figure 6b shows a similar
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Fig. 6: vssReconstruct∗ performance with varying n
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Fig. 7: vssRecoverContrib∗ performance with varying n
performance story, with the latency increasing quadratically as
the cluster size increases though even at n = 211 the latency
is fairly low at 46 milliseconds.
The reason we see the quadratic behavior in
vssReconstruct∗ is that vssReconstruct∗ does a quadratic
number of modular multiplications in a 254 bit prime field.
All multiplicative inverses are precomputed during setup,
which makes the runtime of vssReconstruct∗ very fast even
though there is a quadratic dropoff.
4) vssRecoverContrib∗ Microbenchmark: Figure 7 shows
that vssRecoverContrib∗ throughput and latency is indepen-
dent of the cluster size for both KZG-sAVSS and Ped-sAVSS.
Additionally, Ped-sAVSS’s vssRecoverContrib∗ has exactly
half the throughput (430 vs 860) and twice the latency (118
ms vs 59 ms) of KZG-sAVSS. The constant CPU cost is due to
vssRecoverContrib∗ only computing a share of a DPRF point
evaluation and its associated verificaion proof. The reason
that Ped-sAVSS’s vssRecoverContrib∗ operation is exactly half
as performant than KZG-sAVSS is that Ped-sAVSS has two
polynomial shares that must be recovered while KZG-sAVSS
has one.
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Fig. 9: vssRecover∗ performance with varying n
5) vssRecoverVerify∗ Microbenchmark: Figure 8 shows
that KZG-sAVSS’s vssRecoverVerify∗ operation has higher
throughput and lower latency than Ped-sAVSS. KZG-sAVSS
has a 1.18 times higher throughput at a cluster size of
n = 4, with the performance gap increasing to 13 times at
larger cluster sizes of n = 211. The difference in latency
is also similar, with KZG-sAVSS’s vssRecoverVerify∗ taking
130 milliseconds for all cluster sizes while Ped-sAVSS starts
at 150 milliseconds at n = 4 and increases to 1.7 seconds at
n = 211.
This performance difference occurs since vssRecoverVerify∗
must combine commitments and witnesses from the contri-
butions received from vssRecoverContrib∗. KZG-sAVSS per-
forms this computation using a constant number of elliptic
curve multiplications whereas Ped-sAVSS computes this using
a linear number of elliptic curve multiplications. Thus, as the
cluster size increases, Ped-sAVSS’s performance also degrades
accordingly.
6) vssRecover∗ Microbenchmark: Similar to
vssReconstruct∗, share verification via vssRecoverVerify∗
happens in our implementation upon receiving each share
from a replica, and the costs of these vssRecoverVerify∗
operations are not included in the vssReconstruct∗ results
shown in Figure 9. vssRecover∗ thus incurs costs primarily
due to interpolation (like vssReconstruct∗), evaluation of
the DPRF and interpolation of any witnesses. Therefore,
asymptotically, we see in Figure 9a and Figure 9b that
vssRecover∗ behaves similarly to vssReconstruct∗ but with
an order of magnitude lower throughput and an order of
magnitude higher latency.
B. Incorporating sAVSS into PBFT
We incorporate sAVSS into a PBFT implementation in
order to implement a threshold trusted third party (T3P). We
instantiate our T3P using KZG-sAVSS and Ped-sAVSS, which
we will refer to as KZG-T3P and Ped-T3P. We also implement
and evaluate a key-value store on top of KZG-T3P, Ped-T3P,
and PBFT.
To generate load in our evaluation, a client sends PUT re-
quests asynchronously to the primary. The client pregenerates
the requests to send to the cluster and loops through them once
they are finished. For our throughput experiments, the clients
asynchronously send enough requests at a time to saturate the
system without oversaturating it. For our latency benchmarks,
(a) PUT operation throughput (b) PUT operation latency
Fig. 10: PUT operation performance with varying n
the clients send requests serially and measure the latency of
each request. We used Amazon AWS to run our tests and used
c5.4xlarge instances for all clients and replicas.
Similar to our microbenchmarks, our implementation uses
the Relic [24] cryptographic library for most cryptographic
operations and the BN_P254 elliptic curve. For signatures in
PBFT, our implementation uses the optimized secp256k1
library used in Bitcoin.
1) Benchmarks: Figure 10b shows that there is some over-
head for secret sharing, as we would expect. However, for
all schemes and cluster sizes, the latency is less than 35
milliseconds. While KZG-T3P is slower than Ped-T3P and
PBFT by a factor of 3-8 times, the total latencies are very
small so the user perceived lag would be insignificant.
Figure 10a illustrates the throughput overhead of secret
sharing. At n = 4, PBFT has a throughput of 1170 decisions
per second, while Ped-T3P can make 800 decisions per second.
Thus, we pay a performance penalty of 32% in order to get
secret sharing in a small cluster. The performance penalty stays
roughly constant between Ped-T3P and PBFT. However, since
KZG-T3P is linear, we see the performance penalty shrinking
slightly as the cluster size increases from a factor of 78% at
n = 4 to 60% at n = 25.
Next, we focus on the scalability of the schemes themselves
by looking at the performance dropoff of the system as the
cluster size increases. Figure 10a also shows the benefits of
a fully linear secret sharing scheme as well since the perfor-
mance dropoff of KZG-T3P is the smallest as the cluster size
increased. PBFT took a 78% performance hit in throughput
when going from n = 4 and serving 1170 decicions per second
to n = 25 serving 260 decisions per second. Similarly, Ped-
T3P took a 79% performance hit as well. However, KZG-T3P,
whose performance was dominated by the expensive secret
sharing cost rather than the underlying PBFT algorithm had a
smaller performance dropoff of 60%.
VII. RELATED WORK
This paper makes two primary contributions: an asyn-
chronous verifiable secret sharing scheme sAVSS that has
linear dealer cost and a threshold trusted third party (T3P) built
by combining sAVSS with a Byzantine Fault Tolerant state
machine. We discuss the related works in both areas below.
A. Proactive secret sharing
A treatment of the prior work in verifiable secret sharing and
asynchronous verifiable secret sharing is given in Section II-B.
Unlike those prior works though, another way to approach
share recovery is through proactive secret sharing. Using
proactive secret sharing for share recovery would require
sending a random polynomial that has nothing in common
with the original shared polynomial except for the share that
the recovering replica is interested in.
Prior work in proactive secret sharing [16] is difficult to ap-
ply directly to the problem of share recovery, however. These
works [16], [25] assume a synchronous broadcast channel that
delivers to all replicas instantaneously, which greatly simplifies
the problem of agreeing on a random recovery polynomial.
PVSS [26] does not make any such assumption and can be
used in sAVSS, but it suffers from an exponential setup cost
in the number of faults it tolerates, making it unusable for
tolerating more than a few faults. MPSS [27] uses a Byzantine
agreement protocol in order to explicitly agree on the random
recovery polynomial, which would add a few additional rounds
to sAVSS if used in share reconstruction. Although closest
in ”spirit” to proactive recovery schemes, sAVSS addresses
only the share phase. It is left for future work to see whether
proactive share recovery can be expedited with techniques
borrowing from sAVSS.
B. Privacy in BFT
Methods to store data across n storage nodes in a way
that ensures the privacy, integrity, and availability of the data
despite up to k of these nodes being compromised is a theme
that has been revisited numerous times in the last 30 years
(e.g., [28]–[32]). The proposals in this vein of research often
do not defend against the misbehavior of the data writers. In
particular, a data writer might deploy data to the storage nodes
in a way that makes data recovery impossible or ambiguious,
in the sense that the data reconstructed depends on which
correct nodes cooperate to do so. Protecting against corrupt
data writers is one of the primary goals of verifiable secret
sharing and its derivatives, for which we’ve surveyed the most
directly related works in Section II.
With the rise of blockchains supporting smart contracts,
there has been a resurgence of activity in finding ways to
add privacy guarantees to Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms,
and indeed this is one motivation behind our work. Another
class of approaches to this problem uses zero knowledge
proofs [33], [34] for privacy. These approaches provide a
very strong guarantee where it is impossible for anyone (other
than the data owner) to recover the sensitive data, but where
anyone can validate that the data satisfies some prespecified
properties. However, such systems only work for a limited
set of applications, rather than general purpose state machines
that we target here. Additionally, these systems do not have
any control over the data itself; i.e., the sensitive data must be
managed by the owner, which is not suitable for a large class
of applications.
CALYPSO [35] resolves this through the use of a publicly
verifiable secret sharing scheme, but they require two BFT
clusters—one for access control and one for secret manage-
ment. Thus, their protocol requires more replicas to operate.
Additionally, CALYPSO requires the access-control policy to
be specified ahead of time by the client, whereas sAVSS can
easily allow dynamic access-control policies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a new method for creating asyn-
chronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) schemes for use
in Byzantine Fault Tolerance(BFT) protocols called sAVSS.
We apply this method to two VSS schemes and incorporate
the resulting AVSS schemes into PBFT. We then implement
a Byzantine Fault Tolerant key value store and evaluate the
effectiveness of our scheme.
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APPENDIX A
SECURITY
In this appendix, we show why our composition of sAVSS
along with PBFT is secure. We do this by first observing under
what conditions the share recovery protocol will terminate. To
show linearizability and liveness, we map every execution of
our modified PBFT algorithm to the original PBFT algorithm.
Thus, since the original PBFT algorithm satisfies linearizabil-
ity and liveness, so does our modified algorithm. Then, we
show privacy separately.
a) Share Recovery Protocol Termination.: We claim that
the share recovery protocol will always terminate if f + 1
replicas have successfully completed the sharing and the
network eventually delivers all messages. To see why, recall
that a replica that is missing its share needs the output of
vssRecoverContrib∗ from f + 1 replicas. If f + 1 replicas
are honest, then they will faithfully call vssRecoverContrib∗
and send the output to a replica that is missing its share. The
missing share can then be recovered by using vssRecover∗ to
terminate the share recovery protocol.
b) Normal Case Protocol: In the normal case protocol,
we only have changed how the client constructs requests. If a
client is honest, then we can simply ignore the secrets being
shared in the request and have the client send regular requests
in the original run of the PBFT algorithm. The requests are
consistent due to the binding property of our verifiable secret
sharing (VSS) scheme. If a client is dishonest and sends an
invalid share to the replica, then in the original PBFT protocol
run the client will drop the request message to the replica.
Now, when the message is dropped, the replica can still obtain
the request from another replica in the system. In the modified
protocol, this is done using the share recovery protocol so we
simply wait to deliver the request messages in the original
run until the share recovery protocol terminates. Note that if
the share recovery protocol never terminates in the modified
protocol, that means that less than f + 1 honest replicas have
the request. This means that strictly less than 2f + 1 total
replicas have the request, making it impossible for this request
to be prepared. Therefore, if the modified normal case protocol
never terminates, then neither does the original protocol. Thus,
we see that liveness is unchanged from the original PBFT
protocol.
Additionally, through the binding property of our underlying
VSS scheme, we know that if a request has been committed,
all secret values must be consistently shared. Thus, we see that
the linearizability property also follows from linearizability in
the original protocol along with binding.
c) Checkpoint protocol: The checkpoint protocol is iden-
tial to a case where the state of the replicated service contains
only the commitments of the secret values instead of the
secret values themselves. Thus, by the binding property of
the underlying VSS scheme, we have a one to one mapping
from a run of the checkpoint protocol for our modified PBFT
algorithm and the original PBFT algorithm. Therefore, if the
original PBFT’s checkpoint algorithm provides liveness and
linearizability, then so does our modified algorithm.
d) State Transfer Protocol: The state transfer protocol
can be mapped back similarly to the normal case protocol. A
replica receiving the value of a key using the share recovery
protocol in our modified PBFT would have been receiving the
plaintext value of the key in the original PBFT algorithm. We
simply delay the plaintext value of the key until the share
recovery protocol completes in our modified PBFT protocol.
Additionally, in the state transfer protocol, we know that the
share recovery protocol will complete since at least 2f + 1
replicas have the state at the last checkpoint. This means that
at least f+1 honest replicas have the state, which is sufficient
to guarantee termination during periods of synchrony.
e) Privacy: Our modified PBFT protocol achieves pri-
vacy through the hiding property of the VSS protocol. The
hiding property says that a legitimate adversary (i.e. one that
has at most f shares of the secret) cannot do nonnegligibly
better than guessing the secret at random. Thus, privacy is
satisfied unless an adversay gets at least f+1 shares of a value.
However, this means that some correct replica has shared
the secret with the adversary which contradicts our threshold
assumption. Thus, we see that our modified PBFT protocol
preserves linearizability and liveness while also guaranteeing
privacy.
APPENDIX B
PBFT STATE TRANSFER AND VIEW CHANGE
In this section, we describe the PBFT state transfer and view
change protocols.
A. View Change Protocol
The view change protocol changes the leader. The core
mechanism for transferring safe values across views is for a
new leader to collect a set P of view-change messages from a
quorum of 2f + 1 replicas. Each replica sends a view-change
message containing the replica’s local state: Its local request-
log, and the commit-certificate with the highest view number
it responded to with a commit message, if any.
The leader processes the set P as follows.
1) Initially, it sets a leader-log G to an empty log.
2) If any view-change message contains a valid commit-
certificate, then it selects the one with the highest view
number and copies its log to G. Share recovery is
triggered for any requests in G that the leader is missing
its private share.
The leader sends a new-view message to all replicas. The
message includes the new view number, the set P of view-
change messages the leader collected as a leader-proof for
the new view, and the leader-log G. A replica accepts a new-
view message if it is valid, and adopts the leader log. It may
need to roll back speculatively executed requests, and process
new ones. As usual, processing may entail triggering share-
recovery for any requests where the replica is missing its
private share.
B. State Transfer Protocol
We present a modified version of the PBFT state transfer
protocol that is simpler and more suited when TCP is used
for the underlying network protocol. When a replica has fallen
behind, it sends a state transfer request along with its current
sequence number to at least f + 1 replicas. Some replica will
respond with the most recent valid checkpoint messages and
the messages from the normal case protocol that were missed
by the slow replica. In addition, the response will contain only
the values of the keys that have changed since the sequence
number known to the slow replica as well as the full requests
that came after the last checkpoint.
